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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
from warranty. This is indeed an absurd result which could not possibly
have been intended; yet Zapata would seem to require vendors to list all
such contracts.
In the instant case, the outstanding mineral lease was created by the
landowner in 1930, forty-one years before the creation of the mineral
servitude. Nevertheless, the mineral servitude owner became the succes-
sor in interest of the landowner as to the minerals and the mineral lessor
as to the outstanding mineral lease at the time the mineral servitude was
created. Thus the source of the eviction was the outstanding mineral ser-
vitude from which flowed the mineral lessees's contractual right to con-
duct mineral operations.5 2 In future cases the court should find that in
listing the mineral servitude in the act of sale, the vendor is relieved of
any obligation in warranty for evictions caused by the exercise of con-
tractual rights subordinate to the mineral servitude.5 3
Zapata poses a threat to the warranty provisions of the Civil Code
by breaking down conceptual barriers to the extension of the exception
to warranty where apparent servitudes are the source of eviction. If fu-
ture purchasers of land are to be fully protected by warranty, the court
must re-evaluate its analysis of the function and scope of the traditional
exception to warranty.
Richard Keith Colvin
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND INTENTIONAL TORTS: LeBrane Refined
Defendant, the president and majority stockholder of a closely held
corporation, purchased additional insurance on the life of the plaintiff, a
former vice-president of the corporation, and made the corporation the
beneficiary. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and two corporate employ-
ees brutally beat the plaintiff late one evening outside of his home. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that the tortious acts were not com-
mitted during the course and scope of the defendant's employment. The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and heldthat the defendant's actions
were in large part motivated by his desire to improve the corporation's
52. LA. R.S. 31:114 (Supp. 1974).
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2501.
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finances. Hence the corporation and its insurer were answerable in dam-
ages under article 2320 of the Louisiana Civil Code.' Miller v. Keating,
349 So. 2d 265 (La. 1977).
Article 2320 imposes liability on a master for the damage occa-
sioned by his servants in the exercise of their employment, 2 but contains
an exculpatory clause which limits the master's responsibility to those
acts which he could have prevented.3 The article has its source in article
1384 of the Code Napoleon.4 French jurists have differed in their con-
ceptualizations of the basis for the master's responsibility, 5 and various
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2320 states: Masters and employers are answerable for the dam-
age occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed.
Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage caused by their scholars or ap-
prentices, while under their superintendence.
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers,
teacher and artisans, might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not
done it.
2. Id.
3. Id. 3. Early cases strictly interpreted the exculpatory clause of article 2320 with
the result that only certain torts committed in the physical presence of the master would
fall within the ambit of the article. Ware v. Barataria & Lafourche Canal Co., 15 La. 169
(1840); Burke v. Clarke, II La. 206 (1837); Palfrey v. Kerr, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 503 (La. 1830).
Professor Stone has pointed out that a possible reason for the inclusion of the literal restric-
tion in article 2320 is that "in 1825 we should recall that Louisiana was a slave holding
economy, a source of raw materials rather than manufactured goods, commercial as re-
garded its port, but argicultural as regarded its basic economy. It may have been the
redactor's or legislator's wish to encourage rather than to discourage entrepreneurs employ-
ing contract labor." F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE §
89, at 125 (1977).
Gradually, this strict limitation was abandoned. The erosion of the applicability of
the exculpatory clause was in large part due to the position that the limitation on liability
had never applied to masters under the Code Napoleon and should not apply in Louisiana.
Nelson v. Crescent City R.R., 49 La. Ann. 491, 21 So. 635 (1897).
Currently, the exculpatory clause is not interpreted as a literal restriction. It has been
suggested that the literal code restriction has fallen into desuetude. Blanchard v. Ogima,
253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968).
4. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 41,,215 So. 2d 902, 904 (1968). The French article
provides in part: "Masters and trustees [are responsible] for the injury caused by their ser-
vants and managers in the functions in which they have employed them .. " FR. C. CIv.
art. 1384 (Barristers of the Inner Temple trans. 1924). See also Comment, Master's Vicari-
ous Liabilityfor Torts under Article 2320-4 Terminological "Tar-Baby," 33 LA. L. REV.
110 (1972).
5. Planiol seemingly favored the industrial risk concept. When the rule is applied to
persons engaged in industry or commerce, that is to people who speculate and employ
agents and workmen, the responsibility for faults of the personnel can be justified by the
industrial risk concept in the same way as the risks of accidents which happen to the per-
sonnel itself: The employer receiving the profit for himself should support the risks of the
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reasons for the master's liability are propounded to the present day.6
Louisiana courts have relied upon both French doctrine and the com-
mon law in interpreting the master-servant doctrine. 7 The common law
counterpart to the master-servant doctrine is "respondeat superior." The
term, which literally means "let the master answer,"8 depicts the master's
vicarious liability for the torts of his servants committed within the
course and scope of their employment.9 Louisiana jurisprudence has
drawn upon the common law in interpreting article 2320 to such a great
extent that it is difficult to sever the civil and common law theories.' 0 It
has even been said that "there is a parallel development and history of
vicarious liability in both jurisdictions with almost simultaneous exten-
sions or limitations of responsibility by statute or jurisprudence." " Con-
sequently, Louisiana courts have construed the first paragraph of article
232012 to mean that the employer is liable for the tortious acts committed
by his employees while acting within the course and scope of his busi-
ness. 13
Beginning with the landmark case of Williams v. Pullman's Palace
Car Co., 14 article 2320 has been construed to embrace intentional physi-
cal torts. In Williams the court decided that an earlier doctrine holding a
master liable for a servant's fault or negligence but not for his intentional
enterprise, and among these risks one may include the accidents due to maladroitness of an
agent." 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITi tLt.MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL § 911 (1lth ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959). Planiol, citing R. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS, No. 121, pointed out that
"bad choice or lack of surveillance was, for Pothier, the basis for the responsibility of the
master." 2 M. PLANIOL, supra, at 510.
6. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed. 1971); F. STONE, supra note 3, § 89,
at 125.
7. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 43, 215 So. 2d 902, 904-05 (1968).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (4th ed. 1968).
9. See, e.g., James v. Williams & Son, 177 La. 1033, 1039, 150 So. 9, 11 (1933).
10. See Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 43, 215 So. 2d 902, 904-05 (1968); O.W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, Agency 67-68 (1952).
1I. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 43 n.3, 215 So. 2d 902, 905 n.3 (1968). The com-
mon heritage of the doctrine apparently is the reason underlying the similar usage by civil-
ian and common law courts. Holmes traced the development of the doctrine back to the
frankpledge of Saxon origin and to the responsibility of the Roman paterfamilias for his
slave's tortious acts. Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350-64 (1891). Further anal-
ysis of Roman law vicarious liability may be found in W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 38-60 (1928).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320; see text of article in note 1, supra.
13. LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974); Romero v. Hogue, 77 So. 2d 74 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1954). There is no vicarious liability on a principal under article 2320 for the
physical torts of a non-servant agent. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 44, 215 So. 2d 902,
906 (1968).
14. 40 La. Ann. 87, 3 So. 631 (1888).
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wrong had been altered by modern jurisprudence. 15 The court refused to
base vicarious liability on the servant's motives or the character of the
wrong. Rather, the test of the master's liability was whether the act of
the servant "was something which his employment contemplated, and
something which, if he should do it lawfully, he might do in the em-
ployer's name."' 6 Later cases have extended the scope of the master's
vicarious liability with respect to his servant's intentional torts. The acts
of the servant need not be proper and lawful to hold the master liable
under article 2320,17 but the master will not be held liable unless the
intentional act was committed in furtherance of his business.' 8
Although a master may be liable for the intentional torts of his ser-
vants, several Louisiana appellate courts have narrowly construed the
scope of the term "in furtherance of his employer's business" when in-
tentional torts were involved.' 9 They have required the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the employee was acting within "the ambit of his as-
signed duties and also in furtherance of his employer's objectives." 20
However, the recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in LeBrane v.
Lewis2' refused to recognize that a strict interpretation is necessary. 22
The court applied an analysis which it refined into four criteria: the dis-
pute should be "primarily employment rooted"; it should be reasonably
incidental to the performance of employment duties; it must occur on the
employment premises; and it must occur during the hours of employ-
ment. 23 This four-point analysis has been applied in several subsequent
15. Id. at 91, 3 So. at 634.
16. Id
17. See, e.g., Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Jefferson v.
Rose Oil Co. of Dixie, 232 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 163 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
18. Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
19. Terito v. McAndrew, 246 So. 2d 235 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1971); Bradley v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 163 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Wills v. Correge, 148 So. 2d 822
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
20. Bradley v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 163 So. 2d 180, 184 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
The court noted that in absence of the quoted criteria the master would not be held vicari-
ously liable for the intentional torts of his servant merely because the tort occurred on the
business premises during working hours.
21. 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974).
22. The court noted in dictum that "aside from isolated expressions in intermediate
opinions, we find no modem authority to support the holding that the requirement be
strictly construed in favor of the employer in tort cases." 292 So. 2d at 218 n.3. The court
failed to distinguish between a rule of strict interpretation in all tort cases, and the rule
suggested by the cases cited in note 19, supra, to the effect that courts should be reluctant to
find than an intentional tort was in the furtherance of an employer's business.
23. 292 So. 2d at 218. The court was also careful to distinguish "a risk of harm fairly
19781
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24
The fact that the employer is a corporation does not alter its vicari-
ous liability under the master-servant doctrine. 25 A corporation is vicari-
ously liable for the acts of its officers performed in the exercise of their
assigned functions and within the scope of their employment. 26 A corpo-
ration, like any other employer, will only be held vicariously liable after
an analysis of the motive of the employee committing the act.27 One
recent case, although it found no liability on the part of the corporate
servant, expressly applied the four-point LeBrane analysis in reaching its
conclusion. 28 Moreover, there seem to be no cases which suggest the use
of a different standard to determine vicarious liability for the acts of cor-
porate officers.29 It therefore appears that the identity of the master
under article 2320 is immaterial to his vicarious liability.
In the instant case the court required the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's actions were employment rooted, although not exclusively
so, and that the tort of the defendant was reasonably incidental to the
performance of his official duties.30 However, the supreme court then
held that the last two prongs of LeBrane were largely irrelevant in evalu-
ating the conduct of a corporation's chief executive officer.31 This hold-
attributable to the employer's business" from "conduct motivated by purely personal con-
siderations entirely extraneous to the employer's interests."
24. Mays v. Pico Fin. Co., 339 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341 So.
2d 1123 (La. 1977); Robinson v. Empire Gas Inc. of Lake Charles, 334 So. 2d 813 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1976). See also Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
reversed on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976); Boudreaux v. Yancey, 319 So. 2d 805
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (LeBrane is distinguished but reference is made to the four-part
test).
25. C.H. Rice & Son v. Payne, 151 La. 949, 92 So. 395 (1922).
26. Bright v. Bell, 113 La. 810, 37 So. 764 (1905); Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477, 481
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
27. See Gann v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 131 La. 400, 59 So. 830 (1912); Mays v.
Pico Fin. Co., 339 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La.
1977). In Mays the court noted that the motive of the employee was of paramount impor-
tance in determining whether the tortious act was committed within the course and scope
of employment. Arguably, this is not an additional test ignored by LeBrane. Surely the
motive of the employee is embraced within the first criterion of LeBrane. It would appear
to be an impractical and impossible exercise to differentiate the test of the motive of the
employee from whether the employee's act is employment rooted.
28. Mays v. Pico Fin. Co., 339 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341 So.
2d 1123 (La. 1977).
29. The instant case is probably the first case in which the supreme court has stated
that standard tests to determine whether an act falls within the course and scope of employ-
ment are not wholly applicable to certain corporate officials. See text at notes 30-32, infra.
30. 349 So. 2d at 269.
31. Id.
NOTES
ing was predicated upon the belief that the authority presumably granted
to a corporation's chief functionary is much broader than that responsi-
bility and discretion enjoyed by lower echelon employees. 32
In Miller the defendant had almost exclusive control and direction
over the corporation's finances.33 According to the court, the battery was
in large part committed by the defendant to improve the corporation's
financial outlook,34 because in the event of plaintiffs death the corpora-
tion stood to receive $87,500 in insurance proceeds. 35 In light of these
facts, the court concluded that the defendant's intentional tort was com-
mitted within the course and scope of his employment, thus making the
corporation liable.36 The court also noted that the corporation was cov-
ered by a general liability insurance policy which made the insurer liable
to the plaintiff.37 Due to the liability of the corporation and its insurer
for the defendant's tortious act, the court found it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the torts of the two corporate employees who assisted
Keating were committed in the course and scope of their employment. 38
Initial appraisal of the Miller holding indicates that prior jurispru-
dence concerning the master-servant doctrine is not affected by its hold-
ing. The court's adherence to the position that the defendant's actions
were partly employment rooted, albeit seriously criminal, is consistent in
principle with other cases concerning the application of article 2320.39




35. Id. at 268.
36. Id. at 269. The corporation's vicarious liability may give rise to indemnification.
"According to the jurisprudence, where the Master's liability is purely secondary or vicari-
ous, he is entitled to reimbursement from his servant, the one primarily responsible, in the
event he is required to pay a third person damages." Caldwell v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
271 So. 2d 363, 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). See also Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La.
713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Little v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1965); F. STONE, supra note 3, § 92, at 128; Comment, The Employer's Indem-
niry,4ction, 34 LA. L. REV. 79 (1973). In the instant case indemnification might have little
practical effect since the servant is also the chief stockholder.
37. 349 So. 2d at 269-70. The provision actually provided that the insurer will pay on
behalf of the corporation "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages" because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence.
38. 349 So. 2d at 269-70. It is submitted that had the court found it necessary to
resolve this question the full test of LeBrane would be applicable. After all, it was ex-
pressly noted within Miller that the four prongs of LeBrane are especially applicable to
lower echelon employees.
39. See cases cited in note 17, supra.
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LeBrane,40 probably due to the unique position of the defendant. Al-
though the court's disposition of Miller probably does not signal severe
departure from traditional interpretations of article 2320, the possibility
exists that Miller may create future problems and changes.
The first problem encountered is whether the dilution of LeBrane
applies to all future defendants in cases involving the contours of article
2320. The unique position of this particular defendant would seem to
justify a finding by the court that the defendant was acting within "the
ambit of his assigned duties and also in furtherance of his employer's
objectives,"'4' even though the last two tests of LeBrane were not met.
The defendant was the president of the corporation, the chief stock-
holder, the corporation's top human functionary, and personally charged
with all corporate financial decisions. Apparently no control of any type
was exercised by the corporation over Keating, perhaps because the cor-
porate entity could be said to be embodied in Keating. Therefore, one
should be wary in attempting to interpret the Miller rationale as apply-
ing to any corporate officer. The wide latitude of "mission and author-
ity" possessed by Keating, who was in essence the corporate entity, may
not be shared by other corporate officers or even corporate presidents
who must answer to stockholders or a board of directors. Such future
defendants presumably would be examined in accordance with the four-
pronged rationale of LeBrane.42 Viewed in this perspective, the dilution
of LeBrane was cosmetic and done only to meet special problems posed
by the defendant's unique status.
Questions also arise concerning what type of behavior will be con-
sidered "employment rooted," in cases involving intentional physical
torts under article 2320. While no definite criteria were provided in the
opinion, it can be argued safely that the actions of employees will not be
outside the scope of the master's vicarious liability solely because they
are too violent.43 The Miller court went to great lengths to find the at-
tempted murder employment rooted. The court also drew rather sum-
mary conclusions about Keating's presumed designs towards Miller. No
direct evidence was presented in the opinion to document Keating's al-
40. See text at notes 30-32, supra.
41. Bradley v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 163 So. 2d 180, 184 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
42. See note 37, supra.
43. The instant case serves as a ready example. In another case, Mays Y. Pico Fin. Co.,
339 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1977), there was
an opportunity to decide if a rape by an employee would fall within the master's vicarious
liability. Under proper circumstances, not present in the case, a rape could probably also




leged plot to improve corporate finances by engineering Miller's demise.
The court did not deal with the contention that any benefit to the corpo-
ration was merely incidental, since the defendant, as chief stockholder,
would benefit personally and indirectly by any payment of insurance
benefits to the corporation if it was indeed solvent. 44 The court also
noted that the possible insolvency of the corporation due to outstanding
loans could be a reason for the defendant's actions.45 This factor perhaps
explains the court's conclusion that the battery was employment rooted,
but here, too, the court relied on less than solid evidence. In a footnote
the court admitted that the facts do not necessarily indicate that the cor-
poration was insolvent.46 Whether or not a tradition of "strict intqrpreta-
tion" of article 2320 ever existed,47 the Miller court went to the opposite
extreme, creating virtual presumptions in favor of employer liability.
However, the court's findings were probably justified by the extraordi-
nary circumstances of the instant case. It would have been an exercise in
futility for the court to have attempted to isolate the exact source of the
defendant's motive and authority to commit this tort because Keating
was the corporate entity and not subject to any other corporate officer's
directives.
The result in Miller is manifestly correct as applied to this particular
defendant in light of his broad responsibilities and direct authority. Nev-
ertheless, this case should be restricted to its unusual facts. The four-
point analysis of LeBrane remains an excellent test for determining
whether an act takes place within the course and scope of employment.
However, the LeBrane test should not be viewed as a concrete determi-
nation of what the law is irrespective of peculiar and individual facts.
The test of LeBrane merely represents a laudable attempt by Louisiana
courts to formulate a practical, yet flexible, gauge to determine a master's
vicarious liability under article 2320. The holding of Miller is an affirma-
tion of the flexibility of Louisiana jurisprudence concerning the master-
servant doctrine.
Billy Joseph Domingue
44. The corporation presented this argument which was noted in the appellate opinion.
Miller v. Keating, 339 So. 2d 40, 45 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
45. 349 So. 2d at 267.
46. "As the defendant properly points out, this fact does not necessarily indicate that
the corporation was insolvent, for there was evidence that much of the borrowed capital
had been employed in purchasing land for residential development, that the land was valu-
able and that the company still owned it." 349 So. 2d at 267.
47. See notes 19-20, supra, and accompanying text. But see note 22, supra, and accom-
panying text.
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